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Introduction 
At all levels of American appellate courts, judges often attempt to 
reach unanimous decisions to generate an image of judicial consensus. Yet, 
of course, they cannot always achieve unanimity. Judicial agreement is im-
possible at times because of differing interpretations of salient legal issues in 
pending cases, the application and extension of precedents, or concerns 
over the potential or probable impacts of new decisions on the political, 
legal, and economic systems. Or agreement may be unlikely for more per-
sonal reasons such as differences in attitudes and ideologies, role concep-
tions, competition for influence on a court, or more general forms of in-
terpersonal friction or rivalry. 
Judges therefore naturally encounter peers with whom they disagree 
for a variety of reasons, and such relations may become clearly conflictual 
in nature. Moreover, since judges do not always act as one, the existence of 
conflict is not necessarily a well kept secret. In a rare television interview in 
December, 1982, Justice Harry A. Blackmun candidly observed that most 
cases cause friction in the Supreme Court. Although the interview primarily 
focused on abortion decisions, Justice Blackmun spoke about interpersonal 
relations on the Burger Court generally. These relations, he noted, are "very 
competitive, very clashing ... in the sense that there are opposing views in 
most of our cases." Blackmun added that "friendship and the mutual 
respect ... continues. But if someone's going to play hardball with me, I'll 
play hardball back if I firmly believe in the position." He even suggested 
that reports of conflict on the Burger Court as portrayed in The Brethren ' 
were not altogether false and stated that if the book promoted a more in-
formed public understanding of how the Supreme Court actually functions, 
"I think maybe it served a purpose. " 2 
The existence of such conflict on collegial courts at both the federal 
and state levels has thus been of interest to students of judicial behavior for 
many years. 3 Broadly speaking, the literature indicates that conflict may 
range from personal animus to cloaked disacco.rd. The occurrence of sus-
tained disagreement also underscores and punctuates the political dynamics 
and implications of judicial decision-making. Sheldon Goldman expressed 
it well in 1968, after a painstaking and seminal study of conflict on the 
United States Courts of Appeals, when he concluded that "it is clear that the 
appeals courts are political institutions that make policy concerning "'who 
gets what , when, and how,'" that they "function by an interplay of institu-
tional, per sonality, attitudinal, and ideological variables," and that 
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therefore dissent behavior on appellate courts provides "a rich mine of 
political data ... to be explored.'" 
A well-known example of " acerbic battles" 5 between promine nt federa] 
judges involves Warren E. Burger and David L. Bazelon, each of whorn 
have served since the 1950s on federal appellate courts. Burger an d Bazelon 
sat together on the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Colu mbia cir-
cuit between 1956 and 1969, with Bazelon acting as Chief Judge of the coun 
for the last seven years of that period. Prior to his elevation to the Suprene 
Court in 1969, Burger participated in an ongoing rivalry with Baze lon, and 
in the words of one of their colleagues, they "were at swords' point. " 6 
Two principal reasons for this inability to agree were the att itudinal 
differences between Judges Burger and Bazelon over criminal justice issues' 
and the fact that they apparently disliked each other personally. 8 Students 
of background analysis would probably also add that voting conflic t would 
be highly likely between Burger and Bazelon, the former being a Pro testant 
Republican, the latter being a Jewish Democrat. 9 However, whi le some of 
the causes of this rivalry are known, it has never been studied in dept h. Based 
chiefly on the research of Burton Atkins and Sheldon Goldma n , political 
scientists are generally aware only of the existence of voting conflict be-
tween Burger and Bazelon at the macro level of analysis. '0 By contra st, this 
article explores at a micro level aspects of the conflict betwee n Judges 
Burger and Bazelon by examining their criminal justice voting behavior on 
the D.C. circuit between 1956 and 1969. In promoting an understa nding of 
the behavior of Judges Burger and Bazelon, the article demonstra tes some 
basic ways in which students of judicial behavior may approach research on 
conflict and suggests how the differences between three-judge and en bane 
panels ostensibly affect conflictual interactions in courts as sma ll groups. 
Research Design 
Judicial conflict is operationally defined here in terms of voting 
disagreement in non unanimous cases, as have many prior studies." Under 
this definition, the magnitude of judicial conflict increases in direct propor-
tion to increases in the percentage of cases in which Judges Burger and 
Bazelon disagreed. This definition, if anything, tends to unde restimate the 
actual amount of conflict between Burger and Bazelon since disse nsus is not 
measured here in unanimous decisions as has recent researc h by Burton 
Atkins, Justin Green, and Donald Songer. 12 
Four hypotheses are tested in this article. First, based on previous 
reports, ' 3 we would expect the magnitude of conflict between J udges Burger 
and Bazelon in criminal justice cases to be substantially grea ter than be-
tween Burger and his other appeals court colleagues. Second, we would an-
ticipate that conflict between Burger and Bazelon wou ld be most evident 
when the en bane procedure is used. This expectation reflects pri or findings 
that the en bane procedure tends to increase or underscore intracirc uit con-
flict.,. Third, we would hypothesize that while conflict betwe~n Judges 
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Burger and Bazelon would be intense, it also would vary over time, 
omewhat as demonstrated by related Supreme Court research. " This is 
theoretically logical since there is no apparent reason to believe that highly 
controversial issues over which judges would virtually always disagree are 
necessarily appealed to collegial courts in a consistent longitudinal pattern. 
finally, a related hypothesi would involve the expectation that the 
magnitude of voting disagreement between Judges Burger and Bazelon 
would grow over time because of deteriorating interpersonal relations. In 
other words, personal dislike should aggrevate judicial relations and be in-
creasingly reflected at least to some extent in voting behavior. 
Because of the focus on Judges Burger and Bazelon, the data base con-
j t of the 109 nonunanimous criminal justice cases in which they jointly 
participated from 1956 to 1969. Reliance was placed on the "descriptive 
word" and "topic" methods of the Federal Reporter, Second Series for 
data collection and classification. The approach consisted of several steps. 
The "criminal law" category in the index of each volume was first inspected 
for the 14 years under consideration, and criminal justice subheadings were 
examined for appropriate topics. After discovering all nonunanimous cir-
rninal justice panels on which both Burger and Bazelon sat, the size of the 
data base permitted the reading of each case to insure against misclas ifica-
tions based on subject matter. Then other topics relating to criminal justice 
i sues were cross-referenced to guard against the omission of pertinent 
case . Regarding consolidated cases, all those causing a division on the 
court were considered separate cases for the universe of data. Opinions con-
curring in part and dissenting in part were classified either as a dissent or a 
concurrence, depending on the principal thrust of a judge's opinion. This 
determination was made only after a careful reading of all opinions and 
eems to be a viable alternative to assigning automatically a numerical 
weight to voting positions without reading the opinions themselves, 16 
especially where a relatively small data base exists. 
It should be noted, too, that only very elementary methods are relied 
on in this article. Inferential statistics and the reporting of levels of 
ignificance are unnecessary since the population is the data base, and we 
are not generalizing about other judges or courts. Indeed, some of the most 
authorative past research suggests that such generalizations to other federal 
courts of appeals might be rather difficult since they "differ in their rates of 
dis ention and intracircuit conflict as well as the sources of conflict." 17 
Findings 
The data in Table I shed light on the first hypothesis. Table I shows 
that in nonunanimous criminal justice decisions, Warren Burger maintained 
an obvious conflictual voting relationship between 1956 and 1969 with five 
judges, not just with Bazelon. Burger's highest rate of disagreement did in-
deed o :cur with David Bazelon. However, its magnitude (19.3 percent) is 
not that pronounced when compared to Burger's voting disagreement with 
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Judges J. Skelly Wright, Henry Edgerton, Spottswood Robinson, and 
Charles Fahy. When judges disagree in more than two -thirds of al) 
nonunanimous cases, it is reasonable to say that a relatively stro ng level of 
conflict exists. Therefore, despite reports of conflict specifica lly between 
Burger and Bazelon, we would conclude that they are somewhat misleading 
since Burger also experienced substantial levels of voting conflict with four 
other members of the D.C. circuit. 
TABLE 1 
Voting Agreement Between Judge Burger and His Colleagues 
In Nonunanimous Criminal Justice Cases, 1956-1969* 
Judge 
Percentage of 
Agreement 
Bastian 75.4 (43/ 57) 
Bazelon 19.3 (21/ 109) 
Danaher 87. 7 (57 / 65) 
Edgerton 26.6 (17 / 64) 
Fahy 32.5 (26/ 80) 
Leventhal 50.0 (6/ 12) 
McGowan 47.6 (10/21) 
Judge 
Miller 
Prettyman 
Robinson 
Tamm 
Washington 
Wright 
Percentag e of 
Agree ment 
63.0 (46/7 3) 
86.3 (44/ 51) 
22.2 (2/ 9) 
94.7 (18/19) 
51.7 (30/ 58) 
25.0 (10/ 40) 
*Data in this table include all joint participations between Burger and 
his D. C. circuit colleagues from 1956-1969, not just panels on which both 
Burger and Bazelon served. 
Table 2 permits the testing of the other three hypotheses by presenting 
data, disaggregated into three-judge and en bane panels, for all nonunani-
mous criminal justice cases in which Judges Burger and Bazelon jointly par-
ticipated. Clearly, the second hypothesis also is not substantiate d by the 
data. Burger and Bazelon agreed in just 5.4 percent of all nonuna nimous 
three-judge panels but in 34 percent of all nonunanimous en bane panels. 
Thus, while conflict is generally more evident on a court of appeals when it 
decides cases en bane, these findings suggest that judges who are regularly 
in disagreement may exhibit a higher magnitude of conflict in three-j udge 
than en bane panels. This is undoubtedly explained in part by small group 
dynamics as more judges must be bargained with in an en bane setting." 
This, in turn, may make decision-making more complicated given the larger 
group and deflate the magnitude of voting conflict between particular 
judges . Obviously it is easier to dissent in a three-judge panel which con-
tains a rival judge than where there is a total of nine judges, as on the D.C. 
circuit during these years, seeking to hammer out an agreement. Conflict 
between individual judges may therefore be suppressed in the process of 
majority coalition building in en bane panels. 
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TABLE 2 
Voting Agreement Between Judges Burger and Bazelon in Nonunanimous 
Three-Judge and En Banc Criminal Justice Cases, 1956- 1969 
Year Three-Judge Panels En Banc Panel s 
1956 0/ 10 0/ 2 
1957 0/2 2/ 4 
1958 2/ 9 3/ 4 
1959 1/ 2 2/5 
1960 0/ 2 0/ 2 
1961 0/ 1 2/ 6 
1962 0/ 4 4/ 6 
1963 0/ 3 015 
1964 0/ 3 4/ 5 
1965 0/ 5 0/ 8 
1966 0/ 5 l / l 
1967 0/ 3 0/ 3 
1968 0/ 4 0/ 1 
1969 0/ 3 0/ 1 
Totals 3/ 56 18/ 53 
With respect to the third hypothesis, we would again conclude that it 
should be discarded for three-judge panels, based on the data in Table 2. 
Judges Burger and Bazelon disagreed from the outset in three-judge panels, 
and the magnitude of conflict between them did not vary substantially over 
time. Additionally, when Bazelon became Chief Judge of the court in I 963 
and oversaw rotation assignments in three-judge panels, he apparently did 
not shy away from conflict with Burger. With the exception of I 956 and 
1958, Burger and Bazelon tended to serve together on a slightly higher 
number of three-judge panels beginning in 1963 than before Bazelon 
became Chief Judge of the circuit. The third hypothesis does, however, 
receive some modicum of support regarding en bane panels. Conflict was 
highest in 1956, 1960, 1963, 1965, and 1967-1969, while being more 
moderate in the remaining seven years. Yet, once more, small group interac-
tions within the en bane setting, such as those mentioned regarding the sec-
ond hypothesis, may well account for most or all of this longitudinal varia-
tion in conflict magnitude. 
Nor is the fourth hypothesis supported by the data in Table 2. There is 
no clear relationship between magnitude of voting conflict and time even 
though Judges Burger and Bazelon apparently became more personally 
alienated as the years passed. They disagreed in a large majority of 
nonunanimous three-judge and en bane criminal justice cases as soon as 
they became colleagues in 1956, and no dramatic variation in disagreement 
is evident longitudinally. As some have suggested,' 9 perhaps interpersonal 
~riction is reflected to some extent in the data because the degree of conflict 
is very intense. However, by examining their behavior in three-judge and en 
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bane panels, we certainly cannot demonstrate empirically that inter personal 
friction contributed to an increase in the magnitude of voting co nflict ove 
time. Therefore, if Burger and Bazelon experienced a growth in persona~ 
animosity toward each other, it doe not urface in this particu lar analysis. 
Apparently, despite any dislike which may have existed, factors such as ro)e 
con traints or samll group interactions may have camo uflaged any 
growth in personal animu that might otherwi e be detected in voting patterns. 
Conclusions 
Given previously reported relations between Judges Warre n E . Burger 
and David L. Bazelon, this article provides a case study of two prominent 
federal judges and indicates some ways in which conflict may be analyzed 
by students of judicial behavior. Specifically, it has tested fou r hypothe es 
based on the 109 nonunanimously decided criminal justice cases in which 
Burger and Bazelon jointly participated on the D.C. circuit betwe en 1956 
and 1969. Contrary to our four hypotheses, it was found that the magnitude 
of voting conflict between Burger and Bazelon was not substantia lly greater 
than Burger' rate of disagreement with four other D.C. circuit j udge , that 
Burger and Bazelon were more likely to disagree in three-judge than in en 
bane panels, and chat the magnitude of their voting conflict did not 
significantly vary or increa e over time regardle s of reported inte rper sonal 
friction. Certainly voting conflict does not necessarily, or even in a izable 
minority of cases, mean that "personal dislike" is being exhibited. 
Reasonable men can indeed agree to di agree-a simple fact that must 
always be kept in mind when exploring patterns of judicial voti ng conflict. 
As Sheldon Goldman observed after interviewing 27 appeals court judges, 
interpersonal dislike is rare on the courts of appeals, and "(t] he frequent 
shifting of panel membership, it would seem, deters the develo pment or ag-
grevations of personality conflicts. " 20 
These findings suggest that future research could profitably examine in 
depth the relationships between other appellate court judges, both federal 
and state, to determine if past generalizations about their conflict ual or con-
sensual relations are in fact quantitatively verifiable. Beyond att itudinal , in 
terpersonal, and background differences that may exist betwee n appellate 
court judges, such re earch should also draw upon some of the ba sic theory 
and findings of small group analysis, as this article suggests. In terms of 
small group theory, it seems clear that Judges Burger and Baze lon were 
essentially using sanctions against each other by consi tently vot ing on the 
opposite side of is ues, not being concerned about alienating eac h other for 
purposes of future coalition building. 21 Sanctions were also occasionally 
used via strongly worded dissents authored by both judges whe n the other 
wrote majority opinions for the court. 22 Eclectic approaches exploring 
conflict on American appellate courts, using a combination of tr aditional 
and behavioral analy is, will significantly a sist political scientists in better 
understanding judicial conflict in the future. 
80 
NOTES 
•I wish to thank Sheldon Goldman, Justin J. Green, Donald R. Songer, and S. Sidney 
for their comments on an earlier version of this article which was originally presented as 
!JJrne\ a longer paper at the Annual Meeting of the Southern Political Science Association, 
part O a October 28-30, 1982. 
Atlan!B~b Woodward and Scott Armstrong, The Brethren: Inside the Supreme Court (New 
. Simon and Schuster, 1979). 
York~ Justice Blackmun quoted in Fred Bar bash, "Blackrnun Says Abortion Slurs Hurt Him," 
W: hington Post, December 5, 1982, p. A 7. Other justices have suggested the type of conflict 
as merges on the Supreme Court. See, e.g., William J. Brennan, "Inside View of the High 
that e "New York Times Magazine, October 6, 1963, p. 100; Tom C. Clark, "Internal Opera-
~0ui;!r the United States Supreme Court," American Judicature Society Journal 43 (1959), p. 51. 
uon •See e.g ., David J. Danelski, "Conflict and Its Resolution in the Supreme Court," Jour-
of Co~Jlict Resolution 11 (1967), pp. 71-86; Henry Robert Glick and Kenneth N. Vines, 
~alte court Systems (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1973), pp. 77- 82; Sheldon 
10
1dman "Conflict and Consensus in the United States Courts of Appeals," Wisconsin Law 
~~iew (i968), pp. 461-482; Sheldon Goldman, "Conflict on the U.S . Courts of Appeals 
5-1971: A Quantitative Analysis," University of Cincinnati Law Review (1973), 196 
635-658· J. Woodford Howard, Jr., Courts of Appeals in the Federal Judicial System: A Pf°dy of th~ Second, Fifth, and District of Columbia Circuits (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton 
0~iversity Press, 1981), chap. 7; Steven A. Peterson, "Dissent in American Courts," Journal 
,f Politics 43 (1981), pp. 412-434; C. Herman Pritchett, The Roosevelt Court: A Study of 
~udicial Politics and Values 1937-1947 (New York: Macmillan, 1948); Richard J. Richardson 
and Kenneth N. Vines, The Politics of Federal Courts: Lower Courts in the United States 
(Boston: Little, Brown, 1970), pp. 135-141. See also Sheldon Goldman and Charles M. Lamb, 
ds Judicial Conflict and Consensus: Behavioral Essays on American Appellate Courts (Lex-
~n i~n Ky.: University of Kentucky Press, forthcoming, 1985). 1 g •Goldman, "Conflict and Consensus in the United States Courts of Appeals," p. 482. 
•Howard, Court of Appeals in the Federal Judicial System, p. 206. 
'Ibid., note i. 
'See, e.g., Burton M. Atkins, "Decision-Making Rules and Judicial Strategy on the 
!Jnited States Courts of Appeals," Western Political Quarterly 25 (1972), pp. 632-636; Charles 
M. Lamb, "Exploring the Conservatism of Federal Appeals Court Judges, " Indiana Law 
Journal 51 (1976), pp. 265-277 . 
•see, e.g., Joseph C. Goulden, The Benchwarmers: The Private World of Powerful 
Federa/Judges (New York : Weybright and Talley, I 974), pp. 227-228; Howard, Courts of Ap-
peals in the Federal Judicial System, p. 206; James F. Simon, In His Own Image: The Supreme 
court in Richard Nixon's America (New York: David McKay, 1973), p. 79; Woodward and 
Armstrong, The Brethren, pp. 14, 22-23, 369, 379. Some of these reports are so unusual-if 
not shocking-that at least one deserves quotation. A good example may be taken from Wood-
ward and Armstrong who note comments supposedly made, and actions supposedly taken, by 
Bazelon when Burger was appointed Chief Justice: 
The New York Times . .. quoted an unnamed judge who had worked with Burger on 
the Court of Appeals: "[Burger] is a very emotional guy, who somehow tends to make you 
take the opposition position on issues. To suggest that he can bring the Court together-as 
hopefully a Chief Justice should-is simply a dream." 
Many who knew Burger's old foe, Bazelon, suspected that the comment was his. But 
Bazelon denied having talked to the press. "I was speechless and sick for a week," he said . 
Burger stayed home to avoid reporters . . . He requested that the reporters and 
cameramen be kept off the fifth floor at the Court of Appeals, where his office was, even 
though he was staying away. Later, he learned that the lobby had been filled with the press 
despite his request . "The only way they could have gotten in is Bazelon," Burger told his 
staff. "If I can prove it's true, I'll punch him in the nose." 
Woodward and Armstrong, The Brethren, pp. 22-23 . See also Fred P . Graham, "Burger's 
Down-to-Earth Qualities May Spur Confirmation as Chief Justice," New York Times, May 25, 
1969, p. 55; Sidney E. Zion, "Nixon's Nominee for the Post of Chief Justice: Warren Earl 
Burger," New York Times, May 22, 1969, p. 36; "The New Chief Justice," Nation, June 2, 
1969, p. 682. To be sure, these political journalists may exaggerate the degree of interpersonal 
conflict between Judges Burger and Bazelon. Yet, if only partially accurate, these accounts 
suggest that political scientists have not tapped the full dimensions of such conflict on collegial 
courts and their possible effects on decision-making. 
'See, e.g. , Sheldon Goldman, "Voting Behavior on the United States Courts of Appeals 
Revisited," American Political Science Review 69 (1975), pp. 498, 503-504; Stuart S. Nagel, 
The legal Process from a Behavioral Perspective (Homewood, Ill.: Dorsey, 1969), pp. 227, 
~30: S. Sidney Ulmer, "Social Background as an Indicator to Votes of Supreme Court Justices 
10 Criminal Cases: 1946-1956 Terms," American Journal of Political Science 18 (1973), 
pp. 6~630 . More generally, see C. Neal Tate, "Personal Attribute Models of Voting 
~ehav1or of U.S. Supreme Court Justices: Liberalism in Civil Liberties and Economic Deci-
sions, 1946-1978," American Political Science Review 75 (1981), pp. 355-367. 
81 
••see, e.g., Atkins, "Decision-Making Rules and Judicial Strategy on the United St 
Courts of Appeals," pp . 632-637 ; Burton M. Atkins, "The Longitudinal Contex t of Ju/(cs 
Behavior : The Case of Chief Justice Warren Burger," unpublished manusc ript 1~~f Goldman, "Conflict on the U.S. Court s of Appeals 1965-1971," pp . 655-656 . ' i 
" See, e.g., Glick and Vines, State Court Systems, p. 77; Goldman, "Conflict and Consen 
sus in the United States Court s of Appeals," p. 463; Goldman, "Conflict on the U.S. Co · 
of Appeals 1965-1971, " p. 637; Richardson and Vines, The Politics of Federal Courts P 1uns S. Sidney Ulmer , "Exploring the Dissent Patterns of Eleven Chief Justices: John Ma_;sh·a1?8; 
Warren Burger," paper delivered at the Annual Meeting of the American Polit ical Sciento 
Association , Denver, September 2- 5, 1982. ce 
" Burton M. Atkins and Justin J . Green, " Consen sus on the United States Court s of A 
peals : Illusion or Reality? " American Journal of Politi~<fl Sc!ence 20_ (1976), ~p . 735-?4 
Donald R. Songer , " Consensual and Nonconsensual Dec1s1ons m Unanimous Opmions of th• 
United States Courts of Appeals, " American Journal of Political Science 26 (19g2' pp . 225- 239. Regarding state appellate courts, see Robert J. Sickels, "The Illusion of Judie~ 
Consensus : Zoning Decisions in the Maryland Court of Appeals," America n Political Science 
Review 59 (1965), pp. 100-104. 
" See, e.g. , Goulden, The Benchwarmers, pp. 227-228; Woodward and Armstrong, Tlit 
Brethren, pp. 22-23. 
"See, e.g., Howard, Courts of Appeals in the Federal Judicial System, p. 190; Richardson 
and Vines, The Politics of Federal Courts, pp. 139- 141. 
" See, e.g ., Pritchett, The Roosevelt Court , pp . 25, 242- 246; Glendon Schubert Tlit 
Judicial Mind: Altitudes and Ideologies of Supreme Court Justices 1946-1963 (Evansto~ Ill. 
Northwestern University Press, 1965), pp. 45, 104- 112. ' " 
"See, e.g ., Goldman, "Voting Behavior on the United States Court s of Appeals 
Revisited," p. 492. 
" Sheldon Goldman, " Voting Behavior on the United States Cour ts of AppeaJs 
1961- 1964," American Political Science Review 60 (1966), p . 382. ' 
" See, e.g ., Sheldon Goldman and Austin Sarat , eds., American Court Systems: Readings 
i~ Judicial Process and Behavior (San Francisco : W.H . Freeman, 1978), pp. 490- 522; s. 
Sidney Ulmer, Courts as Small and Not So Small Groups (New York: General Learning Press 
1971) and the research cited therein . Regarding the U.S. Courts of Appeals, see Burton M' 
Atkins , "Judicial Behavior and Tendencies Towards Conformity in a Three Member Group: A 
Case Study of Dissent Behavior on the U.S. Court of Appeal s, " Social Science Quarterly S4 
(1973), pp. 41-53. 
" See the sources cited in note 8 supra. 
'
0Goldman, "Conflict and Consensu s in the United States Courts of Appeals," p. 481. 
See also Howard, Courts of Appeals in the Federal Judicial System, p. 204. 
" Regarding the concept of the use of sanction s on collegial court s, see Walter F. Murphy 
Elements of Judicial Strategy (Chicago : University of Chicago Press, 1964) pp . 54- 56. ' 
" See Charles M. Lamb, "Warren Burger and the Insanity Defense : Judicial Philosophy 
and Voting Behavior on a U.S . Court of Appeals, " American University Law Review 24 
(1974), pp. 91- 128; Charles M. Lamb , "The Making of a Chief Justice: War ren Burger on 
Criminal Procedure, 1956-1969, " Cornell Law Review 60 (1975), pp . 743- 788. 
82 
